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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff has alleged in her Response Brief that 
Defendant failed to show any substantial change of 
circumstances. The Defendant, however, set forth four changes 
in the parties1 circumstances which together amount to a 
substantial change of circumstances. The first is that the 
Plaintiff had relinquished physical custody of the children for 
substantial periods of time prior to the Defendant's Petition 
for Modification. The second change is that the Plaintiff 
removed the children from the Defendant's physical custody 
without warning in the middle of the school year, contrary to 
her signed stipulation. The next change identified was the 
Plaintiff's numerous moves and her interference with the 
Defendant's contact with the children while they were in her 
custody. Finally, the fact that the boys expressed a desire for 
a change of custody and that the oldest child had attained 
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sufficient maturity to understand the consequences of this 
decision was the fourth change in the parties1 circumstances. 
These four changes taken together amount to a substantial change 
of circumstances• Therefore, it was error for the Court below 
to rule that there was no substantial change of circumstances. 
The Defendant has asserted that the Court erred in 
finding it was not in the best interests of the children to 
change custody even if there were substantial change of 
circumstances. The Plaintiff has attempted to point out facts 
and evidence supporting this ruling, but all of the evidence 
and the weight of the evidence were in favor of finding that the 
bests interests of the children would be served by changing 
custody. The Court's reason for ruling that it was not in the 
best interests of the children to change custody was that the 
younger child Isaiah was afraid of his stepmother, was treated 
disparately from his older brother by the Defendant and his 
wife, and that the older child could better adjust to remaining 
with his mother than the younger child would adjust going to 
live with his father. This was all contrary to the testimony of 
the court ordered evaluator who found that Isaiah's fears were 
based upon brain-washing by the Plaintiff in response to the 
upcoming trial, that he did not experience these fears prior to 
his return to live with his mother, and that in spite of his 
fears, it would serve the best interests of the children to go 
live with their father. The fact that the Plaintiff testified 
that both children wanted to go live with their father two years 
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prior to the litigation proves that any fears or disparate 
treatment did not exist for the younger child until the time 
that the custody litigation was commenced and the Plaintiff 
began programming the child at that time. In light of the facts 
and testimony presented at court it was error to find that 
custody should not be transferred to the Defendant because of 
the younger child's fear of the Defendant's wife. 
The Defendant alleges that it was error to admit hearsay 
evidence regarding many conversations reported by the Plaintiff 
which supported her decision to remove the children from the 
Defendant's home without warning and in the middle of the 
school year, contrary to the stipulation of the parties. The 
Plaintiff made no showing that the witnesses were unavailable to 
testify personally at the trial, and the hearsay testimony with 
regard to their statements was self-serving, uncorroborated and 
highly unreliable. The Defendant was unfairly surprised by the 
admission of hearsay evidence as he was unprepared to present 
rebuttal witnesses. Therefore admission of hearsay evidence was 
prejudicial and mandates reversal of the lower court's decision 
which relied heavily upon this testimony. 
The Defendant made a motion to amend the Findings of the 
Court when the Court refused to sustain the Defendant's 
objections to the Plaintiff's proposed Findings. The 
Plaintiff's proposed Findings contained statements which had no 
basis in the evidence and which omitted statements which were 
relevant to the proceedings, namely that neither party had 
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committed any abuse of the children. This was an appropriate 
and necessary Finding for the reason that the Plaintiff had made 
allegations of abuse and cross-examined the Court appointed 
evaluator and the Defendant's witnesses with regard to alleged 
abuse on the part of the Defendant, Therefore, the Court should 
have granted the Defendant's Motion to Amend and should have 
adopted the Defendant's proposed findings which more accurately 
reflected the Court's ruling and the evidence presented in the 
trial. 
Finally, the Plaintiff accuses the Defendant of filing 
numerous non-meritorious actions against her but in fact all of 
his actions have been meritorious. This action particularly is 
meritorious as it is based on the desires of both children at 
the time that it was brought, and because it was supported by 
the statement of the Court ordered evaluator that it was in the 
best interests of the children to change custody. To award 
attorney's fees and costs on appeal under these cirucmstances 
would be to chill the rights of non-custodial parents everywhere 
in their attempt to address the stated needs of their children 
who wish to change custody. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
is. 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THERE WAS NO 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Defendant has set forth detailed and compelling 
facts in his brief supporting his claim that the Defendant did 
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indeed show a substantial change of circumstances at the hearing 
on his Petition for Modification of custody. Defendant also set 
forth in his brief reasons why a rigid scrutiny of the change of 
circumstances prong of the modification procedure is not 
required in this case. The standard for a modification of 
custody under normal circumstances is a high standard and 
requires that the moving party demonstrate significant changes 
affecting the relationship between the custodial parent and the 
minor children involved. As stated in the Plaintiff's brief, 
this is to prevent "ping pong custody" situtations where the 
children do not have the stability of one permanent home. 
The children involved in the custody dispute in the case 
at bar, however, have had several planned and unplanned changes 
in physical custody. Plaintiff argues in her brief on the one 
hand that this had no negative effect on the children and on the 
other hand argues that a custody change should not be 
considered in this case because of the possible negative effects 
of custody changes to the children. The inconsistency of this 
position is obvious. 
In any event, the minor children in this case have been 
subjected to two major changes in physical custody. One change 
was when they came to live with their father for an extended 
period of time according to the stipulation of the parties. 
Plaintiff minimizes the importance of this change of custody, 
stating that it was for a period of one calendar year only. 
(Brief of Respondent, Page 12.) Defendant wishes to point out 
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that prior to the Plaintiff's signing of a Stipulation agreeing 
to transfer custody to the Defendant for one year, he had been 
given physical custody of his minor son Isaac for the year 
prior to the stipulation. If the Court would have granted the 
Stipulation and Petition of both parties, which was signed by 
both parties, he would have changed physical custody to the 
Defendant, but this the Court refused to do in a minute entry of 
July 1, 1987. (Record at 65). The Plaintiff wishes to 
characterize this as a temporary change, lasting only one year. 
However the plan was for the older child to live with the 
Defendant for a two year period, a significant amount of time 
for a child of his age. Also significant if the fact that the 
custody arrangement in the year prior to the stipulation did 
separate the two children. Therefore, the Plaintiff's 
characterization of this visitation as temporary and 
insignificant is inaccurate. Defendant, however, recognizes 
that this by itself it would probably not amount to a 
significant change of circumstances. The subsequent events 
however, coupled with the changes in physical custody do amount 
to a legally cognizable change in circumstances. 
The subsequent events, as set forth in the Defendant's 
brief occurred several months after the Plaintiff signed the 
stipulation agreeing to transfer custody of the children to the 
Defendant. Defendant made all arrangements necessary to having 
the children for the extended period of time as agreed, and 
possibly longer, as testified to by the Defendant, Trial 
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Transcript at 80, only to have the children removed by the 
Plaintiff without warning. Plaintiff in her brief justifies her 
behavior in removing the boys from their father's home without 
warning and in violation of the Stipulation she signed. She 
alleges that considerable amount of testimony was taken at trial 
wherein the Plaintiff explained her "objective rational proper 
reasons for her action." Respondent's Brief at Page 13. In 
fact, all of the testimony taken was from the Plaintiff herself 
and was self-serving, unsupported, uncorroborative and presented 
an unfair surprise to the Defendant who did not know ahead of 
time that hearsay evidence would be allowed with regard to the 
statements of numerous individuals. The opinion of the Court 
appointed custody evaluator was that the Plaintiff acted 
unreasonably in removing the children without prior warning to 
the Pierces. Dr. Morse stated that the appropriate response for 
a parent when there is suspicion of abuse is to "check it out," 
rather than to act in a precipitous manner. (Trial Transcript at 
35). The Plaintiff's self-serving, uncorroborated testimony 
should be viewed with much suspicion in light of the 
demonstrated unreliability of her testimony. She demonstrated 
the unreliability of her testimony when she testified that the 
Defendant was behind in his child support for the month of July, 
1988. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 11-P and Trial Transcript 187. 
In fact, Defendant offered into evidence a cancelled money order 
for child support paid in July of 1988. The Plaintiff then 
retracted her prior testimony that no support was paid in July. 
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(See Defendant's Exhibit 16 D). 
Plaintiff further attempts to minimize the significance 
of the unplanned removal of the children from the Defendant by 
stating that the evaluator, Dr. Louis Morse, testified that he 
could not conlcude that there was any clinical finding of 
instability as a result of the boys1 return to the Plaintiff's 
physical custody. Dr. Morse did not testify that it did not 
happen, simply that he did not observe it. Trial Transcript at 
44. This does not mean that the same did not exist and that the 
facts of the removal of the boys was not a serious one 
affecting their relationship with their custodial parent. In 
fact, a letter filed by the Plaintiff some time after this 
proceeding proves the fact that the boys1 return to their 
mother has had a negative effect upon Isaac as set forth in the 
letter of Dr. Dale K. Wallin, Record at 248, wherein he states: 
"During these two sessions it became quite 
apparent that Isaac was not adjusting to 
continuing to live with his mother here in Chico 
and his brother Isaiah and indicated strongly that 
he wanted to return to Utah whereby he could live 
with his father, Terry Pierce. 
In summary, Plaintiff attempts to minimize and 
rationalize the seriousness of her abrupt, unplanned removal of 
the children contrary to the prior plans of the parties. 
However, the court should consider this, together with the facts 
set forth below to have had a significant impact upon the 
children involved. These facts adequately fulfill the change 
of circumstances prong of the Hogge vs. Hogge, custody test, and 
this court should so find. (See Hogge vs. Hogge, Utah 649 P.2d. 
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51, 1982), 
A third ground set forth by the Defendant in his brief 
as constituting a substantial change of circumstances is the 
Plaintiff's interference with his relationship with the 
children which occurred once the children were removed from the 
Defendant's care. The Plaintiff in her brief denies that there 
has been any interference with visitation, however, the 
Defendant stands by his presentation of the facts and 
circumstances brought forth in the trial transcript as set forth 
in his brief. 
Finally, the Defendant urges the court to consider 
the wishes of a mature child, in appropriate circumstances to 
constitute a substantial change of circumstances. The Plaintiff 
argues in her brief that this position would deprive the court 
of its decisionmaking powers, conferring them instead on the 
minor children involved. The Defendant is not asserting this 
position, he is proposing that where there is a strong 
preference on the part of a child to change custody, bolstered 
by an evaluation stating that it is in the child's best interest 
to live with the parent of his preference that this should be 
considered a substantial change of circumstances when the child 
reaches a sufficiently mature age to form such an opinion. 
Plaintiff argues that in this case, to change custody 
based upon the desires of the older child, Isaac, ignores the 
preferences of the younger child, Isaiah. The Plaintiff asserts 
that- Isaiah, the parties' youngest son, had a fear of being 
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with his step mother and that he was "unequivocal," about his 
custody preference. This is contrary to the findings of the 
custody evaluator who found that Isaiah was ambivalent, 
moldable, and did not always tell the truth. Trial Transcript 
at 16 and 18. Dr. Morse documented the fact that Isaiah's 
stated prefence changed over time. When the custody evaluation 
was undertaken he wished to live with his father. Trial 
Transcript at 15. When he returned to live* with his mother he 
stated that he wished to live with his mother. Trial Transcript 
at 15. The fear that he expressed of his step-mother according 
to the custody evaluator was the result of programming. Trial 
Transcript at 17. The Court's finding that Isaiah could not 
adapt to living with his father was not supported by the 
evidence, the testimony of the individuals involved, or the 
expert. In light of the custody evaluation, it is not 
"preposterous and frightening" to accept the proposition that 
the wishes of the older child should be taken into 
consideration. This is so even where a younger childfs 
preference are to the contrary. The Plaintiff asserts that the 
Defendant must comply with the rigid standard set forth in 
Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 626 (Utah 1987) which requires a 
finding that the custodial parent's relationship with the 
children was affecting them adversely. The Plaintiff asserts 
that there was. no evidence presented by the Defendant at the 
modification hearing which gave an indication that the Plaintiff 
had become incapable of adequately parenting her children. As 
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set forth in the Defendant's brief, the Defendant asserts that 
Plaintiff's behavior in giving up custody of both boys for 
extended periods of time and then forcing the children to return 
to her without prior warning is demonstration of inadequate 
parenting. Her actions designed to interfere with the 
relationship with the boys and their father after she removed 
the boys from the father's custody are evidence of inadequate 
parenting and subsequent letters filed by her own counsel 
indicate that the custodial arrangement is non-functioning, 
unhealthy and detrimental to Isaac, (See letter from Dale K. 
Wallin, Record at 248 stating that Isaiah was not adjusting to 
continuing to live with his mother). In addition, Dr. Morse did 
testify that it is detrimental to a child to ignore his 
preferences as to custody, all other things being equal. Trial 
Transcript at 21. 
Defendant cites the case of Hirsh v. Hirsh, 725, P. 2d 
1320 (Utah 1986) as a case governing substantial change of 
circumstances in which the facts were similar to the case at 
bar. The Plaintiff argues in her brief that the case of Hirsh 
vs. Hirsh is not directly on point. This is true. The facts 
are not exactly the same as in the Pierce case, however, the 
Hirsh case stands for the proposition that a change of physical 
custody may amount to a substantial change of circumstances. 
Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's actions arise to the same 
level of seriousness and significance as in the Hirsh case. The 
Defendant did not have the Plaintiff's telephone number after 
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her removal of the boys and he was therefore unable to initiate 
contact with them. The Plaintiff argues that because she 
allowed the children to have telephone contact with the 
Plaintiff during this period of time that this was not a serious 
problem. Under these circumstances it is patently false that 
the Plaintiff never took any steps to terminate or interfere 
with the boys1 contact or communication with their father. The 
same should be considered a change of circumstances justifying a 
review of custody.Aside from arguing that her actions did not 
amount to a change of circumstances justifying review of 
custody, the Plaintiff suggests that the Court should look at 
this particular case with great scrutiny because of "numerous 
litigations" filed by the Defendant against the Plaintiff. In 
fact the Defendant has only been involved in two prior 
litigations, one was to obtain specific visitation rights, (R. 
at 31,) which he received by stipulation of the parties. (R. at 
49) A second involved an Order to Show Cause filed by him on 
March 28, 1985 when the Plaintiff moved from the State of Utah. 
Defendant's summer visitation was increased in this action to 60 
days rather than the previous 30 days. (R. at 64) . Plaintiff 
is exaggerating and misrepresenting the facts when she states 
in her brief that the Defendant has brought several post divorce 
petitions to modify and has never prevailed. On page 15 of 
her brief the Plaintiff refers to a petition presented for a 
seventh or eighth time. This is simply not true as a review of 
the record revealsThe Defendant's position is that he is not 
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required to present evidence demonstrating a problem with the 
Plaintiff's parenting. The facts presented by the Defendant at 
trial, however, and set forth in his brief justify a finding of 
a substantial change of circumstances. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE 
CHILDREN TO REMAIN WITH THEIR MOTHER BECAUSE OF ISAIAH'S FEAR OF 
HIS STEPMOTHER. 
The Defendant asserts in his brief that the Court's 
finding that it was not in the best interests of the children to 
change custody was an abuse of discretion and against the clear 
weight of the evidence. The Court's ground for so finding was 
largely based upon the younger child Isaiah's fear of his 
stepmother. The Plaintiff justifies the Court's reasoning by 
asserting in her brief that Isaiah's fears of his stepmother 
were "real." This ignores the fact that Dr. Morse was able to 
meet with both the children prior to the hearing. His 
evaluation of Isaiah's fears was that they were not 
substantiated, were not in proportion to reality, and were the 
result of the Plaintiff's "programming." Trial Transcript at 
17, 26. The Court in effect rewarded the Plaintiff for her 
programming of the minor child which resulted in his fear. 
Defendant has not mischaracterized Dr. Morse's testimony at all 
but has quoted it directly. Plaintiff alleges on Page 29 of her 
brief that Isaiah's fears of his stepmother are not recent, 
however, this contradicts her own testimony that Isaiah wanted 
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to go live with his father in the past. At the time that Isaiah 
requested he be able to live with his father he was free from 
the pressure of a custody evaluation and custody trial, i.e., 
free from programming. Therefore Isaiah's feelings and 
attitudes prior to this action should be considered more a more 
acurate indication of his feelings and should be given the most 
weight. His feelings which were the result of "programming" 
should not be considered to be as accurate or as important to 
the custody decision because, as stated by Dr. Morse, they are 
not based upon reality. 
Plaintiff attempts to bolster her position that Isaiah's 
feelings were actually based upon reality by making reference to 
several friends who could have testified, however, this 
argument is speculative, and should be disregarded. The 
Plaintiff had the opportunity to present evidence and she chose 
not to do so. 
The Plaintiff argues that it was not erroneous for the 
Court to disregard the recommendation of the custody evaluator 
when it was against the wishes of Isaiah. This may be a good 
theoretical position, but in this case, where Isaiah's fears 
were a result of the Plaintiff's own programming, it was 
certainly inappropriate to give those more weight than the 
mature views of an expert who has thoroughly studied the 
situation. Plaintiff alleges that several witnesses in addition 
to Dr. Morse testified that Isaiah was afraid of his stepmother, 
however, Plaintiff does not refer to a single one or to a single 
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page of the trial transcript in support of her statement. In 
fact, no other witnesses testified that Isaiah was afraid of his 
stepmother • The Plaintiff's representations that other 
witnesses testified on this subject in support of her position 
are erroneous. In conclusion, the Court erred in finding that 
the best interests of the children mandated maintaining the 
status quo. Its finding was an abuse of discretion and against 
the clear weight of the evidence. 
The Defendant argues in his brief that the court did not 
make adequate findings with regard to the best interests of the 
children under the standard set forth in Jensen v. Jensen, 77 5 
P.2d 436 (Utah App. 1989). The Plaintiff alleges that the Court 
made adqequate findings, however, the Court's findings do not 
rise to the level required by case law cited by the Defendant in 
his brief. 
The evidence at trial was clearly in favor of custody 
being awarded to the Defendant. The Court relied upon 
unsubstantiated, uncorroborated statements of the youngest child 
Isaiah and the Plaintiff's hearsay testimony justifying the 
Plaintiff's actions. The court failed to based its decision 
upon any substantiated, corroborated reason contrary to the 
recommendations of the custody evaluator. As set forth in the 
Defendant's brief, the Court erred in its findings that the best 
interests of the children required that both children remain 
with their mother. 
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Ill, 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT 
Plaintiff argues in her brief that it was proper for the 
Court to admit the exceptions to the hearsay rule under 803 (3) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Statements presented in 
evidence to which the Defendant objected do not fall under 8 03 
(3) because they do not reveal the existing state of mind, 
emotions, sensation or physical condition of the declarent. 
The hearsay statements offered by the Plaintiff over the 
objections of the Defendant were self-serving, uncorroborated 
and highly unrealiable. As set forth above, the Court had 
reason to view the testimony of the Plaintiff with suspicion 
because of earlier erroneous claims with regard to the child 
support amounts paid. The admission of the hearsay statements 
over the objections of the Defendant was extremely prejudicial 
to the Defendant in that it did not allow him an opportunity to 
cross-examine the witnesses who were claimed to have made the 
statements. There was no showing made that the declarants were 
unavailable, and the Defendant was not able to present rebuttal 
testimony because he did not know in advance that hearsay 
evidence would be admitted with regard to statements of these 
individuals. In the absence of the hearsay evidence, the Court 
might well have found that the Plaintiff had acted unreasonably, 
had failed to take into consideration the best interests of the 
children, and that a substantial change of circumstances had 
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occurred. Therefore, as set forth in the Defendant's brief, it 
should be deemed to be error to admit the hearsay statements 
made by the Plaintiff and because of the weight given these 
statements by the Court, the ruling below should be reversed. 
IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AMEND THE FINDINGS 
AS PER THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS 
The Defendant asserted in his brief that the Court's 
failure to grant his Motion to Amend the Findings was error. 
One statement made by Judge Murphy from the bench when he 
rendered his decision was that he found no abuse had been 
committed by either party. This statement was not included in 
the Plaintiff's proposed Findings. Defendant objected to the 
Plaintiff's Findings and requested that this statement be 
included. Record at 145-150. When the Judge signed the 
Plaintiff's Findings without the statement included, the 
Defendant made a Motion to Amend the Findings to include the 
language. The Court denied this motion. The Plaintiff alleges 
in her brief that the finding with regard to abuse was not 
relevant, and therefore it was correct that the Court should 
deny the Motion to Amend. Defendant asserts, however, that the 
Court thought this issue was important or it would not have made 
the finding. The Plaintiff made abuse an issue in the hearing 
on the Petition for Modification which required that the 
Defendant call witnesses to establish that no abuse had 
occurred. Trial Transcript at 30. These individuals were 
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brought in by the Defendant merely to rebut the Plaintiff's 
accusations. Therefore, the Court's statement with regard to 
abuse was relevant to the proceedings . and should have been 
included in the Plaintiff's Findings. When the Plaintiff 
refused to include this statement, the Clourt should have 
granted the Defendant's Motion to Amend. 
In addition to the omission of the statement with regard 
to abuse, the Plaintiff erroneously incorporated a statement 
into the Findings that had no basis in the evidence from the 
trial. The Plaintiff included a statement that Isaiah's fears 
of his stepmother were "concrete, real and pervasive." Record 
at 133, 134. The Defendant objected to the inclusion of this 
language as erroneous. The fears were identified and 
articulated by Isaiah but discounted by the custody evaluator as 
set forth above and were not corroborated by any witness except 
Plaintiff herself. Therefore the Court should have granted the 
Defendant's Motion to Amend proposing that this language be 
dropped. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
The Court should not award judgment against the Defendant 
as this was a meritorious appeal. Plaintiff is constantly 
accusing the Defendant of filing non-meritorious actions. His 
first Petition for Modification filed June 27, 1983, Record at 
31 asked for specific visitation which he received in the 
Stipulation dated December 15, 1983. Record at 49. It can 
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hardly be said that his successful request for specific 
visitation was a non-meritorious action. An Order to Show Cause 
asking for a change of custody due to the Plaintiff's move from 
the State was filed on March 28, 1985. Record at 57. The 
result of this was that the Defendant's summer visitation was 
doubled from 30 days to 60 days. Record at 62. This action 
cannot be characterized as a non-meritorious action either. 
The third Petition for Modification for Change of Custody was 
jointly signed by both parties and if non-meritorious, is the 
fault of both parties equally, as it is signed by both. Record 
at 65. (Plaintiff's signature is on Page 67) . The custody 
claim which is the subject of this suit is due to the request of 
both sons as is documented by the evaluation of the custody 
evaluator who found that both boys wanted a change of custody at 
the time he evaluated the boys in Chico. The custody evaluator 
also felt it would serve the best interests of the children for 
custody to be changed to the Defendant. Under these 
circumstances, the Defendant's Petition for change of custody is 
meritorious. To find that appeal of the Court's refusal to 
change custody is frivolous would be to chill the rights of all 
non-custodial parents who wish to address the stated desires of 
their children to change custody. There is reasonable, legal 
and factual basis for this Petition or the custody evaluator 
would never have recommended a change of custody. Defendant was 
deeply concerned by the Plaintiff's behavior in violating the 
Stipulation signed by her removing the children from his care 
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without warning and her actions in restricting telephone 
contact. He also wanted to respond to the stated desires of 
both boys to come and live with him. He was also following the 
Court ordered custody evaluator's recommendation that steps be 
taken that he be given custody. None of these reasons amount to 
mere anger or disappointment that he has not received custody. 
It is ridiculous to suggest that sanctions be awarded against 
the Defendant and it would be chilling to the legitimate rights 
of non-custodial parents to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant is generally concerned for the well-being of 
his minor children. It is not his own needs which are foremost 
in this matter but those of the children. Nowhere are their 
needs are being addressed except by the custody evaluator whose 
recommendations were not followed by this Court. Counsel for 
the Defendant respectfully requests that this Court look at the 
needs of the children rather than technicalities in addition to 
the law and facts which are in favor of the Defendant and 
reverse the lower Court's decision and award custody to the 
Defendant. 
DATED this ^ day of March, 1990. 
'- Tamara J. Hauge 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
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